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Lit·i·ga·tion: A legal contest by judicial process. I 
Dic·tio·nary: A reference book containing words or names 
typically important to a particular subject or activity along with 
discussion of their meanings and applications.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Does a "contest by judicial process" describe litigation's "means and 
applications"? Overwhelmingly, no. Litigation is not about judges: it is about 
default judgments, settlements, plea bargains. It sometimes does not even involve 
judges at all.3 Litigation is not about trials: the amount of litigation that goes to 
• Dean Gilbert A. Holmes Professor of Clinical Theory and Practice, University of Baltimore School 
of Law. The author acknowledges receipt of a University of Baltimore summer research stipend in 
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I Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1988). 
2/d. 
3 See infra text accompanying note I I I. 
186 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [18:2015] 
trial is infinitesima1.4 It is not about "process": the process is so minimal that to 
dignify it with that term stretches the word beyond recognition.s It is not a 
"contest": it is an exercise where one side has no plausible chance of winning, 
especially since that side either has no lawyers or lawyers with overwhelming 
caseloads to enforce whatever written rules do exist.6 
This Article explores the reality oflitigation by, first, examining some of the 
psychological bases for the power of the standard-and misleading---conception 
of how litigation is perceived. It then addresses how this definition omits the 
overwhelming amount of litigation as it truly is: litigation involving low income 
litigants in both civil and criminal cases. The Article concludes by examining 
whether public conception oflitigation will ever reflect what "litigation" really is. 
II. PERCEPTIONS OF LITIGATION 
Perceptions of litigation emerge from how cognition works, and then 
manifests itself among the lay public, law students, and lawyers themselves. What 
follows explores each ofthese topics. 
A. Information Streams 
There is extensive literature about how humans perceive what is in the world.7 
Social psychologists in particular have developed an important insight: the brain 
includes, omits, and constructs perceptions of what is "out there."g This is not 
merely an element of cognition: it is cognition. For it to be otherwise would lead 
to, in William James' phrase, "a bloomin' buzzin' confusion."9 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 15, 135-40. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 86-153. 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 92-121, 141-45. 
7 Citations to this literature would alone take a book. For a few seminal texts, see for example 
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE 
ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
Another rich and related area of research explores "categories"-how meaning is defined in terms of 
how situations and things fit within "prototypes." Raffaele Caterina, Comparative Law and the 
Cognitive Revolution. 78 TuL. L. REV. 1501, 1512 (2004); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND 
DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987). 
8 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 7, at 23 (cognition entails "conceptions of what matters); 
Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 35 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 603,606 (1908) (The brain "manage[s] knowledge in a variety of ways to promote 
the selective availability of information."). 
9 WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890). 
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Cognition thus limits how we view the world. We see what is before us-
what has been called the "information stream." 10 Things outside the "information 
stream" are invisible. This idea was well articulated by Francis Bacon in 1620: 
"things which strike the senses outweigh the things which do not immediately 
strike it, though they be more important."11 This observation generates crucial 
consequences: we only see what is before us and assume that we and others act in 
accordance with what we see. 
One idea in social psychology particularly relevant to the study of litigation 
is the concept of"scripts."12 This concept explains how we act in a given situation 
based upon our "expectations" about how the world is supposed to be.13 As its 
name implies, a script is akin to acting in a play. 
Consider the script for the conventional idea of litigation. 14 The arrangement 
of a courtroom-the set of the play-is unvarying: it is adorned with flags, there 
is a raised bench in the front of the room, seats face the bench, there are chairs 
inside a "box" for a jury, there are tables with chairs in front of the bench. We 
also know how the play will unfold: judges enter while a voice instructs "all rise"; 
the judge wears robes and is addressed as "Your Honor"; the judge does not refer 
to herself through personal pronouns, but, rather, as "the Court"; no one 
"approaches the bench" without the judge's permission; lawyers stand or sit 
behind the table in front of the bench; the only people who speak directly to the 
judge are lawyers; witnesses are sworn in; lawyers ask them questions through 
direct and cross-examination; there are closing arguments; finally, the jury renders 
a verdict. 15 
10 JON SILVERMAN, CRIME, POLICY AND THE MEDIA: THE SHAPING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1989-20 I 0 
5 (2012). 
II FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON (1620), reprinted in FRANCIS BACON: A SELECTION OF HIS 
WORKS 338 (Sidney Warhaft ed., 1965). 
12 JEAN M. MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA THEORY 94-108 (1984); 
Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status o/the Script Concept, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 715, 715-29 
(1981); ROGER c. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND UNDERSTANDING: 
AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1977). 
13 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 7, at 46. A classic example is the "restaurant script." We all 
know what to expect and how to act upon entering a restaurant. We are greeted, we are asked how 
many there are in a party, menus are distributed, a server arrives, food is served, questions are asked 
about the quality of the meal, the bill arrives, tips are calculated, and so on. There are also actors, the 
"dramatis personae" ofthe play. We know who they are and the parts they will play: chefs, the person 
who greets us upon arrival, servers, and so on. ROBERT J. STERNBERG & KARIN STERNBERG, 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 337-40 (6th ed. 2012). 
14 I have addressed this issue previously in Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts and Meaning 
in Adjudication and Mediation, 62 ME. L. REV. 62,76 (2010). 
15 One aspect of the litigation script is pervasive and entirely misleading: the frequency oftrials. There 
are increasingly very few trials. The trend has been so pronounced that it has been called the "vanishing 
trial." Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination o/Trials and Related Matters in Federal 
and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). Given, however, that the "vanishing trial" 
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The courtroom script expresses the powerful norms of litigation. 16 Lawyers 
have the leading roles. There is formal adherence to process. Litigants are only 
heard through narrowly framed questions. There might be other players: 
cantankerous judges, overreaching prosecutors,17 unscrupulous defense 
attorneys,18 lying witnesses, and so on. But the script remains. As a result, rare 
variations from the script shock because of how they powerfully subvert what is 
expected. Consider Al Pacino famously shouting to a judge: "You're out of order! 
This whole trial's out oforder!,,19 In light of the litigation "script," the language 
is telling. The script has become, literally, out of order: it turns on its head the 
ironclad sequence and hierarchies of the litigation script which, in turn, reaffirms 
how entrenched the script is.20 
B. What Gets Noticed? 
So what sorts of cases trigger intense and prolonged media scrutiny? The 
following formula21 offers one way of approaching the question: 
(Fame of Defendant)22 x (Affluence)23 x (Criminal Case)24 = (Intensity of 
Coverage) + (Length of Coverage) 
cuts across both what this Article argues is real litigation as well as the misleading script of"litigation," 
the misimpression is not a focus of this Article. 
16 The raised bench, the deference, the flags reflect, as Robert Cover famously observed, the power of 
state-sanctioned "violence" against litigants through enforcement of judgments, incarceration, and, 
potentially, death. ROBERT COVER, VIOLENCE AND THE WORD, reprinted in ROBERT COVER, 
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203-38 (Martha Minow et 
al. eds., 1993). 
17 This is a common element of media portrayals of prosecutors. Robert Rubinson, Professional 
Identity as Advocacy, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 27-29 (2012). 
18 Jd. at 29-30. 
19 ••• AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Columbia Pictures 1979). 
20 Anthony G. Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner interestingly identify scripts as the "hidden cargo" of 
narratives, and, to continue the metaphor, screaming calling a judge "out of order" rather than the 
judge saying someone else is out of order is akin to throwing the cargo overboard. AMSTERDAM & 
BRUNER, supra note 7, at 121. 
21 An earlier version of this formula appeared in Following Trials that Really Maller, DAILY RECORD 
BALTIMORE, MD, Nov. 26, 2004, at 15A. For an exploration and gathering of authorities on this topic, 
see Pauline K. Brennan & Abby L. Vendenberg, Depictions of Female Offenders in Front-Page 
Newspaper Stories: The Importance of RacelEthnicity, 2 INT'L J. OF SOc. INQUIRY 141 (2009). 
22 Sharon L. Davies, The 192 I Headline Trial, Alabama v. Edwin R. Stephenson-Seeing Ourselves 
in a Grain of Sand, 55 ST. loUIS U. L.J. 1317, 1319 (2011)(citing Professor Lawrence Friedman). 
23 Prominent examples are OJ. Simpson and the Duke Lacrosse Players, both discussed below. See 
infra text accompanying notes 30-33, 51-52. 
24 Overwhelmingly, criminal, not civil, cases gamer virtually all media attention. RAy SURETTE, 
MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES, REALITIES, AND POLICIES 121 (3d ed. 2007) 
(explaining that "[a]lthough criminal law is only one area of the law and in the real world most 
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While millions of criminal defendants are prosecuted each year,25 virtually 
none are famous or affluent. 26 As a result, the percentage of criminal matters that 
reach public consciousness is infinitesimal.27 The situation on the civil side is, if 
possible, even more extreme. The untold numbers of civil case-both 
administrative and judicial-are, overwhelmingly, "zeroes" in terms of fame, 
affluence, and (of course) being a criminal case. Apart from the occasional 
celebrity divorce, no civil cases reach public consciousness. In the end, then, a 
tiny number of criminal cases define what is perceived as litigation. 
The following describes the formula in action by examining the 
extraordinarily rare characteristics of cases covered by the popular media. 
1. The Duke Lacrosse Players 
In 2006, three college athletes attending Duke University were accused of 
raping an African-American woman at a party.28 The athletes were white.29 The 
accused in the Duke Lacrosse Players case (as it came to be known) were different 
from "typical" criminal defendants.30 The players were well-off and students at 
an elite college. Their case engendered intense media scrutiny that extended over 
a year. 3 I In contrast, "typical" criminal defendants are poor and uneducatedY 
Only a tiny percentage of cases involving such defendants are noticed. The few 
that are noticed -often cases involving violent felonies -might trigger coverage 
attorneys practice other specialties, most lawyers in the media are criminal lawyers and specialize in 
criminal law."). 
25 Public defender programs in twenty-two states handled 1,491,420 cases. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & 
LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COUNTY-BASED AND 
LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007 3 (2010). The total number nationally is many millions 
more: the study did not count cases in the most populous states, including California, Texas, New 
York, Florida, lllinois, and Pennsylvania. See id. at 1-3. 
26 See generally CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIM INAL CASES 1 (2000). An important government study found that 80% of 
criminal defendants live in poverty. See id. 
27 James Garofolo, Crime and the Mass Media: A Selective Review of Research, 18 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 319, 322-23 (1981). 
28 Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence. and False Identifications: A Fundamental 
Failure to "Do Justice", 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007) 
29 Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media and Criminal 
Defendants, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 107 (2008). 
30/d. at 94 (noting "the amount of attention devoted to the injustices suffered by the Duke students' 
relative to the attention given to potential injustices suffered by more-typical defendants."). 
31/d. at 110. The media scrutiny extended from March 2006 to April 2007. See id. 
32 See Melissa Hickman Barlow, Race and the Problem of Crime in Time and Newsweek Cover 
Stories. 1946 to 1995. 25 Soc. JUST. 149 (1998); Steven Chermak, Predicting Crime Story Salience: 
The Effects of Crime. Victim. and Defendant Characteristics, 26 J. CRIM. JUST. 61 (1998). 
190 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [ 18:2015] 
on local news outlets, but such stories blend into one another after a day or two of 
coverage. 33 
In the end, the charges against the Duke Lacrosse players were dismissed and 
the prosecution of the case was almost universally condemned.34 The prosecutor, 
Mike Nifong, withheld evidence exonerating the defendantsY He was found to 
be a "rogue prosecutor" by the North Carolina Attorney GeneraP6 and was 
subsequently disbarred.37 The injustice of the case led to widespread outrage, 
including the publication of books 38 and articles in the media39 and academia.40 
Indeed, the outcry was so intense that it led to, at best, dubious comparisons 
to other cases. One particularly troubling example is a book characterizing the 
case as a "modem Scottsboro" -as if the situation of the Duke Lacrosse players 
was analogous to what the Scottsboro Boys faced: threats of lynching, one day 
trials, and death sentences for African-Americans reflecting the deep-seated 
oppression, hostility, and violence in the Jim Crow South of the 1930'S.41 In 
contrast, the Duke Lacrosse case, while unjust, did not reflect widespread 
oppression of student athletes at elite universities. 
In any event, the Duke Lacrosse case saturated the media, and what was 
portrayed still operated within the perceived norms of litigation: 
33 See supra note 32; Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peilley, Public Perceptions oj Race and Crime: The Role 
oJRacial Stereotypes. 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375 (1997). 
34 See RACE TO INJUSTICE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (Michael L. 
Seigel, ed. 2008); Mosteller, supra note 28. 
35 See sources cited supra note 34. 
36 Duff Wilson & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12,2007), 
http://www.nytimes.comJ2007/04112/us/12duke.html? _ r=0. 
37 Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics. and the Road to the Disbarment oj Mike Nifong: 
The Critical Importance oj Full Open-File Discovery. 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008). 
38 STUART TAYLOR & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE 
SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2008). 
39 See R. Taylor Matthews lll, Comment, The Duke Lacrosse Rape Case - A Public Branding. Is 
There a Remedy?, 25 ST. loUiS U. LJ. 669,670 (2008) (referring to an "avalanche" and "deluge" of 
media coverage). 
40 David A. Elder, A Libel Law Analysis oj Media Abuses in Reporting on the Duke Lacrosse 
Fabricated Rape Charges, II VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 99 (2008); Dan Subotnik, The Duke Rape 
Case Five Years Later: Lessons Jor the Academy, the Media, and the Criminal Justice System, 45 
AKRON L. REV. 887 (2012); Mosteller, supra note 28. 
41 R.B. PARRISH, THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE 
MODERN SCOTTSBORO (2009). The case is notable for the Supreme Court's holding of the right to 
counsel in federal cases. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell's recognition of a "right to 
counsel" in criminal cases -a right broadly recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright-has not generated 
individualized representation of criminal defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S 335 (1963). 
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• The defendants were represented to the utmost by attorneys 
who, as far could be seen, had no other cases to work on. 
• The judicial system lavished individualized attention on the 
case and the treatment of the defendants. 
• The prosecutor did not press for an immediate plea bargain. 
191 
Thus, while unjust, the Duke Lacrosse case reaffirmed prevailing VIews of 
litigation. The "litigation" scrip[l2 remained very much in place. 
2. The 0.1. Simpson Case43 
The greatest adjudicative earthquake of the last fifty years was the 0.1. 
Simpson case. Despite the passage of time, the case has retained its status as "the 
most publicized murder trial in American history,"44 if not, as some have said, all 
ofhistory.45 
0.1. Simpson was the preeminent football player of his time. His fame led to 
appearances in advertising, television, and film. In 1994, Simpson was accused of 
murdering Nicole Brown-Simpson, his ex-wife, and Ronald Goldman, a waiter 
who was returning Brown-Simpson's mother's glasses that were left in a 
restaurant where Goldman worked. The case triggered an explosion of public 
attention even before legal proceedings commenced, when a bizarre and 
prolonged car chase was widely broadcast on live television. The drama continued 
unabated from arrest to a not guilty verdict rendered by the jury in 1995, and 
subsided only when commentary on the verdict ran its course. Simpson's lawyers 
(some of whom were well-known prior to the Simpson case46), the prosecutors,47 
witnesses, and the presiding judge all gained measures of fame. The trial took 
over eight months. During the period just prior to and when the jury announced 
42 See supra text accompanying notes 12-15. 
43 This Article will not go into detail about the facts of the case on the assumption they are well known. 
Countless articles and over twenty books have been written about the case, many by central figures in 
the trial, including Simpson himself. As to academia, a Westlaw search returned forty-six articles with 
Simpson's name in the title, and 4,420 where the Simpson case is cited or discussed. For an overview 
of the case that is less sensationalized than most, see JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE RUN OF HIS LIFE: THE 
PEOPLE VERSUS 0.1. SIMPSON (1996). 
44 Joanne Armstrong Brandwood, Note, You Say "Fair Trial" and I Say "Free Press": British and 
American Approaches to Protecting Defendants' Rights in High Profile Trials, 75 N.Y.V. L. REV. 
1412, 14 \3 n.5 (2000). 
45 Jonathan M. Remshak, Comment, Truth, Justice, and the Media: An Analysis of the Public Criminal 
Trial, 6 SETON HALL CaNST. L.1. 1083, 1085 (1996). 
46 The primary trial attorneys were Johnnie Cochran, F. Lee Bailey, Robert Kardashian, and Robert 
Shapiro. Alan Dershowitz assisted, and two experts in DNA analysis, including, most memorably, 
Barry Scheck, also represented Simpson. 
47 The lead prosecutor was Marcia Clark. Media scrutiny of Clark reached such absurd levels that her 
change of hairstyle generated substantial media coverage. See Richard Gabriel, "This Case Is Brought 
to You By . .. ": How High-Profile Media Trials Affect Juries, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725,727 (2000). 
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its verdict, "long distance telephone calls dropped by 58% and trading volume on 
the New York Stock Exchange fell by 41%[.]"48 This pause in the everyday 
business of the country is estimated to have cost the United States' economy $480 
million.49 
The verdict generated its own frenzy of controversy, with reactions to the 
verdict falling along racial lines. 50 This is no surPrise given the swirl of racial 
issues infusing the trial: an African-American defendant allegedly murdered his 
white ex-wife and another white victim; the defendant's lead counsel was accused 
by some of using race in Simpson's defense; and a majority of the jurors were 
African-American. 
The Simpson case not only "struck the senses" but overwhelmed them. It was 
the adversary system on steroids. Enormous resources were expended including 
lawyers who appeared to be handling no other cases, a jury selection process that 
lasted well over a month, minute and detailed examination of evidence, the 
retention and testimony of numerous experts, attorneys delivering extended 
opening statements and closing arguments, an intensely focused trial judge who, 
seemingly, had no other judicial business to attend to. Many concluded that 
Simpson's chances of acquittal were negligible without his ability to retain many 
high-priced defense attorneys.51 Nevertheless, the overall process was still 
familiar, albeit far more expansive and expensive than what most defendants less 
rich and famous could afford. Many--especially whites-concluded that the 
Simpson verdict was wrong, that Simpson, literally, got away with murder. 52 For 
these observers the result was tainted, but the process, although bloated, was not 
bloated beyond recognition: it was still, as popularly understood, litigation 
underneath all its lavishness. 
3. Media Coverage: The News and the Movie House 
The rise of technology, including twenty-four hour cable channels and access 
to the internet, has intensified media coverage of sensationalized cases. Court TV, 
which began in 1991, rose to prominence through another celebrity trial-that of 
William Kennedy Smith, a nephew of John and Robert Kennedy, who was 
481d. at 725. 
491d. 
50 African-Americans tended to support Simpson's exoneration while Whites believed Simpson should 
have been convicted. The distinction has been shown empirically. Christo Lassiter, The o.J. Simpson 
Verdict: A Lesson in Black and White, 1 MICH. 1. RACE & L. 69 (1996). 
51 Ange1ique M. Paul, Note, Turning the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us 
Anything About the Real Law?, 58 OHIO ST. L.1. 655,685 (1997). 
52 As with so much else relating to the Simpson trial, the number of citations for this proposition could 
go on for a very long time. Two examples with similar titles: VINCENT BUGLlOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE 
REASONS WHY 0.1. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER (1996); MIKE GILBERT, How I HELPED 0.1. 
GET AWAY WITH MURDER (2008). 
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accused of rape in that year. 53 Court TV truly burst into prominence, however, 
four years later as a result of the Simpson case. 54 Some shows are now solely 
devoted to coverage of "the law,,55 and legal commentators abound.56 Much of 
this media treatment is presented point/counterpoint fashion reflecting the 
different mind sets of defense attorneys and prosecutors -a reflection of the 
conventional adversary system itself. 
Nevertheless, the vanishingly small category of cases that gamer media 
attention is not a function of advancing technology. To the contrary, infamous 
cases of earlier times were still criminal cases in which the accused was famous 
and/or wealthy. Examples include the 1925 murder trials of Leopold and Loeb, in 
which the defendants were affluent University of Chicago Law School students,57 
or the 1934 trial of the accused kidnapper in the Charles Lindbergh baby case, in 
which the father of the victim was the most widely admired American hero of his 
time. 58 The formula holds. 59 The minute subset of cases characterized by wealth 
and celebrity has defined how litigation is viewed in the public imagination for a 
very long time. 6o 
Apart from media coverage, countless films portray lawyers. Virtually all 
depict popular conceptions of litigation. Consider the few that have become 
memorable enough to have entered public consciousness. These films include 
comedies like My Cousin Vinny,61 with its depiction of legal inexperience and 
culture clashes in rural Alabama, and Legally Blonde,62 which presents a high-
profile murder case in which the accused is represented by a Harvard Law 
Professor. Dramas include ... And Justice for All 63 and, perhaps most famous 
53 Paul, supra note 51, at 662. 
54/d. at 663. 
55 Benjamin Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law: 0/ Public Perceptions and Procedural 
Protections, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1777, 1783-84 (2013) (referring to television host Nancy Grace as 
displaying the "overwrought absolutism" of the prosecutor point of view). 
56 This concern has led to discussions about "ethical code for legal commentators." For an overview 
of this debate, see Jacquenette M. Helmes, Note, An Ethical Code/or Legal Commentators: What Is 
Its Value?, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 767 (I 999). 
57 HAL HIGDON, THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY: THE LEOPOLD AND LOEB CASE (I975). 
58 The accused kidnapper was Bruno Richard Hauptmann. Hauptmann was subsequently convicted 
and executed. WILLIAM A. COOK, THE LINDBERGH BABY KIDNAPPING (2014). 
59 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
60 Interestingly, at least one book includes the OJ. Simpson, Leopold and Loeb, and the Lindbergh 
baby case as, collectively, "crimes of the century." GILBERT GElS & LEIGH B. BIENEN, CRIMES OF THE 
CENTURY: FROM LEOPOLD AND LoEB TO OJ. SIMPSON (I 998). 
61 My COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992). 
62 LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 200 I). 
63 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
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of all, To Kill a Mockingbird,64 with its compelling story of integrity and justice 
and injustice in the segregated south. Whether comedic, ennobling, or 
overwrought, all portray litigation in all of its conventional procedural trappings. 
It is also notable that all portray criminal defense-the type of case that almost 
invariably captures public attention. 65 
III. PERCEPTIONS OF LITIGATION IN ACADEMIA: LAW STUDENTS66 
The Law School curriculum is driven by the "case method."67 To state the 
obvious, cases are the foundation of the case method. The oft-stated goal oflegal 
education-"thinking like a lawyer"-entails analyzing cases and "synthesizing" 
rules from cases. 68 The originator of the case method was Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School in the nineteenth century. Langdell 
himself, as memorably described by Jerome Frank, believed "that 'all the 
available materials ... are contained in printed books'" and "had an obsessive and 
almost exclusive interest in books."69 His case method embodied this belief. 
The "case method" is a misnomer because virtually no cases generate written 
judicial opinions. 7o In fact, the "case method" is really the "appellate opinion 
method," and appellate opinions have distinctive characteristics. Appellate cases 
have lawyers. "Facts" are assumed. Appellate opinions tend not to focus much on 
64 To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962). 
65 See supra text accompanying notes 21-27. One popular film that does break the mold to a degree is 
The Paper Chase, with its indelible portrayal of Harvard Law School Professor Kingsfield. THE PAPER 
CHASE (20th Century Fox 1973). Kingsfield is a model of the imperious law school professor intent 
on humiliating terrified students in order to, as he puts it, make "a skull full of mush ... think[] like a 
lawyer." Nevertheless, this film still focuses on an elite law school education and certainly does not 
address the mass of litigation discussed in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 86-153. 
66 This section will defer addressing clinical legal education, upon which the Article will focus. Infra 
text accompanying notes 159-64. 
67 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 
52-53 (1983); Margaret Martin Barry, et aI., Clinical Educationfor this Millennium: The Third Wave, 
7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1,2-3 (2000). 
68 See Paul Figley, Teaching Rule Synthesis with Real Cases, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 245,246 (2011) 
(discussing the "principles of rule synthesis" from appellate opinions). 
69 Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907---{)8 (1933). In Langdell's 
defense, one article has characterized Langdell as a "straw man" for "simplistic (if not simple-minded) 
formalism." Catharine Pierce Wells, Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 
551,552 (2010). In any event, Langdell is seen, whether fairly or unfairly, as the father of the case 
method. 
70 Consider the massive numbers of adjudicated cases with pro se litigants which are resolved in 
minutes-hardly the sorts of cases that generate judicial opinions. See infra text accompanying notes 
87-121. 
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clients as individuals: they are merely stick figures embedded in a "fact pattern."71 
The appellate focus oflaw school also extends to the multiplicity of moot courts-
another place where the role of clients is solely to facilitate the presentation of 
arguments about legal doctrine. 
Very rarely do other views oflitigation creep into "doctrinal" courses in law 
school. To take a rare example, one property text makes reference to low-income 
tenants in eviction cases.72 In the "Notes and Questions" regarding retaliatory 
eviction, the full reference to such tenants is as follows: 
For a study showing that legal services attorneys represent poor 
and minority tenants with strong defenses to eviction, and that 
raising these defenses does not pose significant costs on 
landlords, see Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly 
Compassion or Justice Serviced?, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 385 
(1995).73 
Consider what the author does and does not describe. There is no reference 
that the cited study found legal services attorneys who represented the "extremely 
poor ... were able to prevent or delay their evictions, helping the tenants either 
to remain in their homes or to secure alternate housing without suffering sudden 
dislocation or homelessness."74 The author focuses solely on the financial impact 
of such representation on landlords, not tenants. Even this rare mention of 
litigation involving low-income participants is only in "Notes and Questions" on 
the doctrine of retaliatory eviction. It is supplemental and non-essential. 
One specific course that does ostensibly focus on attorneys and clients is 
Professional Responsibility-a class law schools must offer in order to be 
accredited by the American Bar AssociationJ5 The subject of professional 
responsibility or "legal ethics" has grown rapidly in recent years, and the lawyers' 
rules of professional conduct have been revised with increasing frequency.76 The 
bulk of these courses examine the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct in detail 
and rarely delve into anything apart from a generalized view of what lawyers do. 
71 I have elsewhere explored the simplicity of the presentation of "facts" in appellate cases in Robert 
Rubinson, Aflorney Fact-Finding, Ethical Decision-Making and the Methodology of Law, 45 ST. 
LOUIS U. LJ. 1185 (2001). 
72 DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY LAW 568 (201 I). 
731d. at 569. 
74 Steven Gunn, Note, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Serviced?, 
13 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 385,421 (1995). 
75 ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302 (a)(5) (requiring "substantial instruction 
in ... the history, goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal profession and its 
members"). 
76 See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-II. The 
Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 206 (2002). 
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Some leading textbooks do explore the realities of litigation beyond the rules by 
exploring the massive numbers of unrepresented Iitigants.77 This treatment, 
however, can go from relatively substantiaP8 to nonexistent. 79 
In the end, most courses on professional responsibility focus on the doctrine 
of the "law governing lawyers."so This perspective, like other similar ones in law 
school, avoids the messiness of reality and assumes a process that reflects widely 
accepted norms of how litigation operates. 
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF LiTIGA nON AMONG LA WYERS 
Law students become lawyers, and thereafter practicing law becomes reality. 
Due to what has been called assuming "the normativity of experience,,,sl lawyers' 
understanding of what lawyers do depends primarily upon what a particular 
lawyer does. Having only represented organizationss2, or personal injury clients, 
or middle-class clients in family law, or advising clients about trusts and estates, 
or representing individuals or organizational clients in "transactional" lawyers, 
most attorneys know nothing of the places where low-income litigants go because 
few lawyers go there.s3 
The lawyers who do go to such places-public interest lawyers engaged in 
individual representation-constitute a tiny percentage of the profession as a 
77 LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 790-96 (3d 
ed.20(2). 
78Id. at 789-848 (includes a chapter devoted to problems relating to the "provision of legal services"). 
79 THOMAS D. MORGAN ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS (11th 
ed. 20 II). This has long been the leading text for professional responsibility classes, although less so 
as the subject has matured and more texts proliferate. 
80 This term has gained currency with the relatively recent addition of the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Goveming Lawyers (2000). 
81 Dale W. Griffin & Less Ross, Subjective Construal. Social Inference, and Misunderstanding, in 24 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 319,337-38 (Mark P. Zann ed., 1991). 
82 Increasing numbers of lawyers represent organizations and not individuals. The most recent 
statistics are from 2005, which showed that 64% oflawyers represent organizations. JOHN P. HEINZ, 
ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 29 (2005). This figure has likely 
grown since then. 
83 See Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89,92-99 (2005). 
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whole. 84 The result: 1 % of a $100 billion legal industry is devoted to the needs of 
low-income Americans. 85 
V. THERE IS No SUCH THING AS "LITIGATION": MASS ADJUDICATION 
Sensational cases are vanishingly rare: after all, if it were otherwise, they 
would not be sensational. In fact, vanishingly rare is an overstatement: their 
numbers are infinitesimal as compared to the volume of criminal cases, and zero 
in terms of the civil justice system because sensational cases are all criminal 
cases. 86 What follows is what litigation really is for virtually all litigants. 
A. Civil Cases 
As the New York Court of Appeals has said, "many kinds of private litigation 
. drastically affect indigent litigants [including] eviction . . . mortgage 
foreclosures, [and] repossession of important assets," but "courts and litigants 
must make do with what exists."87 Stephen Wexler offered a more pungent 
summary: "poor people are always bumping into sharp legal things. "88 As far as 
civil litigation is concerned, this has been called "crisis" for so long89 that the 
"crisis" appears to be never-ending. 90 This, in fact, means it is not a crisis at all 
84 David Luban, Essay, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest 
Lawyers. 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003) (explaining there is "about one lawyer for every 240 
nonpoor Americans" and "one lawyer for every 9000 Americans" who would qualify for legal aid). 
No doubt a crucial aspect of this reality of modem law practice is the yawning disjunction between 
what public interest lawyers get paid and what lawyers in private practice, particularly in large law 
firms, get paid. NALP (Nov. 2011), Starting Salaries-What New Law Graduates Earn-Class 0/2010, 
http://www.nalp.orglstarting_salaries_-_what_new Jaw_graduates _earn _ -_class _ oC 20 I O. 
85 Luban. supra, note 84. One explanation for these findings is, as noted above, increasing numbers of 
lawyers are representing for-profit organizations. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO 
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2d ed. 1994); HEINZ, ET AL., supra note 82. 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 21-27. 
87 In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57-58 (N.Y. 1975). 
88 Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law/or Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1970). 
89 Access to Justice. About the Initiative, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/atjlabout-atj.html( .. [G]aps in legal services for the poor and middle class 
constitute not just a problem, but a crises ... as difficult and intransigent as any now before us."). 
Some thirty years earlier, Jerold S. Auerbach noted how "judges and lawyers have monotonously 
conceded ... that legal institutions have defaulted on their obligations to provide justice for all," but 
the concession has not triggered change. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING 
DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 143-44 (1983). 
90 This is the case even though there have been good faith attempts to improve the situation. For 
example, there are many "access to justice commissions," directories, web sites, pro se assistance in 
various forms, and the like. ABA RESOURCE CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE INITIATIVES, REPORT 
TO THE CCJ/COSA: COMMITTEE ON ACCESS, FAIRNESS AND PUBLIC TRUST (2012). As described 
infra, these efforts have had little impact in redressing the problem. 
Another area of much discussion relates to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Consider 
the Preamble of Model Rules: 
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because a "crisis" is "an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a 
decisive change is impending."91 Unfortunately the situation is quite stable. No 
decisive change is in sight. 
The vast majority of all low-income litigants are unrepresented.92 Some have 
recognized how profoundly troubling this is and have sought to remedy it. One 
prominent effort has been to seek recognition of a Civil Gideon-a right to 
counsel in civil cases,93 or, more modestly, a right to counsel in specific types of 
cases.94 While there have been successes in this effort, the few examples are 
narrowly circumscribed.95 Even if successful, whether such recognition could 
A lawyer should be mindful of the deficiencies in the administration of justice 
and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot 
afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote 
professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access 
to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers 
cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble 6 (2013). The Model Rules, however, do not obligate 
lawyers to do anything about this "deficiency" either through pro bono or any other steps. See Id. R. 
6.1 (providing that lawyers "should" engage in voluntary pro bono public service). The prior, and first, 
modem set of ethical responsibilities-the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility adopted 
in I 970-similarly proclaims how a lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to 
make legal counsel available. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1980). None of 
these rules require pro bono work. 
9) MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 296 (11th ed. 2004). 
92 DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 5 (2004) (explaining that "[i]n most family, housing, 
bankruptcy, and small claims courts, the majority of litigants lack legal representation ... [Yet] too 
little effort has been made to ensure that it is fair or even comprehensible to the average c1aimant."). 
93 Such arguments have been made as far back as 1923. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil 
Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923). For a recent overview, see Debra Gardner, Pursuing a Right 
to Counsel in Civil Cases: Introduction and Overview, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 167 (2006). The 
American Bar Association, joined by a range of other state and local bar associations, unanimously 
passed a resolution in 2006 asserting a right to counsel in civil cases involving "shelter, sustenance, 
safety, health, and child custody." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL 
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2006), available at 
http://www.americanbar.orglcontentldamlabaladministrative/legal_ aid _indigent_defendants/Is _ sclai 
d _ 06A 112Aauthcheckdam.pdf. There is also a national organization that pursues the goal of Civil 
Gideon. NATIONAL COALITION FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.orgl 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2015). For a recent review and critique of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this 
area, see John P. Gross, The True Benefits of Counsel: Why "Do-It-Yourself" Lawyering Does Not 
Protect The Rights of the Indigent, 43 N.M. L. Rev. I (2013). The most recent Supreme Court decision 
addressing (and denying) a right to counsel in civil cases is Turner v. Rogers. Turner v. Rogers, 131 
S. Ct. 2507 (20 II) (showing that the Court declined to find a right to counsel in a civil contempt 
hearing). 
94 Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 
(2013); Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need To Recognize a Right To Counsel for Indigent 
Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557 (1988). 
95 A few states, for example, recognize right to counsel in cases involving "abuse/neglect, civil 
contempt, paternity, and civil commitment cases." John Pollock, It's All About Justice: Gideon and 
the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 39 AS.A HUM. RTS. 12 (2013). Another effort related to Civil 
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even resolve issues facing indigents is debatable given the allocation of resources 
needed to meaningfully fulfill such a right.96 
In any event, massive numbers of tenants in the United States do not have 
lawyers. Consider matters involving housing. In fora nationwide where landlord-
tenant matters are adjudicated, a tiny percentage of tenants have counse1.97 Russell 
Engler has gathered data on the issue.98 His results and other data from individual 
jurisdictions are sadly consistent. In New York City, 12%99 of tenants are 
represented, while in Chicago the figure is 7.1 %.100 The Massachusetts judiciary 
reported that 8.3% of tenants are represented in Boston Housing Court. 101 
Consider also data relating to other kinds of proceedings. In foreclosure 
proceedings, 7.1% of New Jersey homeowners and 5% of homeowners in 
Philadelphia were represented. 102 Only 25% of women seeking protective orders 
are represented. 103 A $10 limit on attorney's fees in claims for veteran's benefits 
has the practical effect of forcing veterans to proceed pro se in these types of 
cases. 104 
Gideon directed at low-income litigants are arguments for the existence of socioeconomic rights, 
which would obligate government to provide food, education, and shelter. These rights, ifrecognized, 
might infer a private cause of action. Frank Michelmen has been a prolific and influential scholar in 
this area. See Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America 
Away, 6 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 663 (2008). 
96 Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won't Fix Family Law, 122 YALE LJ. 2106 (2013). Ironically 
some have argued that Gideon itself has failed to provide meaningful representation for criminal 
defendants. Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of 
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883 (2013). See irifra text accompanying notes 141-53. 
97 Matthew Desmond, Tipping the Scales in Housing Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.coml2012/1 I 130/opinionltipping-the-scales-in-housing-court.html (describing 
that "[i)n many housing courts around the country, 90[%) of landlords are represented by attorneys 
and 90[%)oftenants are not"). 
9R Russell Engler, Connecting Se/fRepresentation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About 
When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 37,46-51 (2010). 
99 Carroll Seron, et aI., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomesfor Poor Tenants in New York City's 
Housing Court: Results ofa Randomized Survey, 35 LAW & SOC'y REV. 419,421 (2001). 
100 Anthony J. Fusco, Jr. et aI., Chicago 's Eviction Court: A Tenant's Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L. 
ANN. 93, 114-16 (1979) (URB. L. ANN. is now known as WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.). 
101 Bos. BAR ASS'N ON THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATION IN 
EVICTION CASES AND HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION: A REPORT ON THE BBA CIVIL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL HOUSING PILOTS 7 (2012); Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the 
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges. Mediators. and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1987, 2057-63 (1999). "The assistance of counsel substantially enhances the probability of success." 
Id. 
102 THE IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATION, supra note 101, at 4-5. 
103 Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect 
Battered Women, II AM. U. J. GENDER SOc. POL'y & L. 499,511 (2003). 
104 The Supreme Court upheld this limitation in Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors. Walters 
v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
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As to the actual process accorded to low-income litigants who are pro se, 
perhaps Deborah Rhode has said it best: "civil courts take weeks to try a 
commercial dispute between wealthy businesses but give less than five minutes 
to decide the future of an abused or neglected child."105 Baltimore's Rent Court, 
for example, has only one judge assigned per day, and yet that judge often has 
daily a docket of 1,050 cases. I06 As a result, "the average case receives less than 
30 seconds of judicial review."107 The process here involves massive numbers of 
default judgments 108_not exactly the stuff of Civil Procedure classes. 
Foreclosure cases are the same. The foreclosure crisis flooded courts with a 
volume of cases they were ill-equipped to handle.109 Scandals involving "robo-
signing," "robo-verification," and "rocket dockets" reflect the process accorded 
to such cases. I 10 Remarkably, even apart from the foreclosure crisis, many states 
have long employed "nonjudicial foreclosure" which dispenses with judicial 
involvement altogether. III Even with judges, virtually no foreclosure cases have 
trials, cross-examinations, judges, and, overwhelmingly, attorneys. "Rocket 
105 Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1793 (200 I). 
106 A System in Collapse, 16 Abell Rep., no. 2, Mar. 2003, at 2. Remarkably, this is an administratively 
imposed limit, which means that without the limit the number would rise even higher. 
1071d. Court's rarely recognize such realities, but a rare example otherwise is 144 WoodnifJCorp. v. 
Lacrete. 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992) (New York 
City's Housing Court cases are "disposed of at an average rate of five to fourteen minutes per case, 
with many settlements in the range of five minutes or less"). 
108 Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in 
Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 578-82; Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Bait. City, 760 A.2d 697, 
705 n.6 (Md. 2000) (stating that "out ofa total of807,000 civil cases filed in [State] District Court .. 
. nearly 570,000 were landlord-tenant cases, but only 21 ,000 of those landlord-tenant cases (3.7% were 
contested") (citing Annual Report of the Maryland Judiciary 1998-99, Table DC-4. 
109 The number of foreclosure cases rose from 800,000 in 2005 (no small number) to 2.9 million in 
2010. Lydia R. Nussbaum, ADR's Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized 
Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1905 (2013). 
110 See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Amid Mountain of Paperwork, Shortcuts and Forgeries 
Mar Foreclosure Process, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlcontentlarticle120 10/09/22/ AR20 I 0092206 1 32.html (describing how "[ t ]he nation's 
overburdened foreclosure system is riddled with faked documents, forged signatures and lenders who 
take shortcuts reviewing borrower's files"); Andrea J. Boyack, Community Collateral Damage: A 
Question of Priorities, 43 LoY. U. CHI. L. 1. 53,135 (2011); Nabanita Pal, Facing Foreclosure Alone: 
The Continuing Crises in Legal Representation, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE I, 10 (2011), 
http://www . brennan center. org/ sites/ defaultlfi les/legacy _ faci ngJoreclosure _alone. pdf (describing 
signatures by a mortgage servicer employee who, in a deposition, "admitted to signing off on 
thousands of affidavits purporting that the servicer had a right to foreclose on homeowners -without 
ever reviewing the cases). Courts accommodate the influx of cases with "rocket dockets" which, in 
the spirit of robo-signing itself, fail to present even a facade of due process. Michael Corkery, A 
Florida Court's 'Rocket Docket' Blasts through Foreclosure Cases, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18,2009), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 123491755140004565. 
III Nussbaum, supra note 109, at 1894. 
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dockets" would make for rather dull viewing. Ratings would no doubt suffer, 
although real-life consequences for litigants are anything but dull. 
Debt collection cases are yet another example of a sham process. Peter 
Holland examined these cases in Maryland in 2014.112 He describes a "shadow 
system"113 that requires debtors to attend "resolution conferences" at which 
creditors are always represented and less than 2% of debtors are. 114 The invariable 
"resolution" is that creditors obtain judgments against debtors, which, in turn, 
quickly trigger procedures to enforce the judgments. I IS Holland found comparable 
results in other jurisdictions. 116 He also notes that the situation is hardly new: 
another study found similar results some forty years earlier. 117 
Moreover, these issues are not limited to urban centers. A similar lack of 
process characterizes "courts" in rural jurisdictions. Indeed, the level of process 
accorded in these courts, some of which are presided over by non-lawyers, are at 
times even more negligible and arbitrary than that accorded urban litigants. 118 
The minimal process low-income litigants experience is both characterized 
and facilitated by the lack of representation. The "adversary system" has been 
praised as "the greatest engine ever developed for the discovery of truth," I 19 but 
lawyers fuel the engine. If there is only one lawyer the engine will not work. 120 
112 Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 27 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179 (2014). 
113 Id. at 233. 
114 Id. at 195. 
115 It is ironic, if little-noticed, the largest category of rules of civil procedure involve enforcement of 
judgments. Nine rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address enforcement actions. One 
representative state-Maryland-has fifteen. 
116 Holland, supra note 112, at 225-28. 
117 Id. at 241 (citing DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 
(1974)). 
118 A series in the New York Times traced the "process" accorded litigants in small town courts. 
William Glaberson, Broken Bench, How a Reviled Court System Has Outlasted Critics, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/nyregion/27courts.html?ex=11701 33200&en= 
88f3fdf4193734e4&ei=5070&J=0 (describing how courts that "are the key institutions of justice in 
more than 1,000 small towns and suburbs across New York"-are mostly presided by non-lawyer 
amateur judges who "leav[eJ a long trail of injustices and mangled rulings"); William Glaberson, 
Broken Bench, Small-Town Justice, With Trial and Error, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/26/nyregion/26courts.html?ex= 1170 13 3200&en=acbfdac2ec7b48 
81&ei=5070 (describing courts presided over by non-lawyers, including judges with no college 
education, with most judges displaying "[aJn unfamiliarity with basic legal principles"); William 
Glaberson, Broken Bench, In Tiny Courts of N. Y, Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. Times (Sept. 25, 
2006) http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html?pagewanted=all& _r=0. 
119 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT THE COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chadbourn 
ed. 1974). 
120 An irony is that there are numerous proclamations that pro se litigants should be accorded no 
additional assistance. Russel Engler has gathered substantial authority regarding this issue. Engler, 
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As one scholar evocatively put it, the lack of representation leads to "[s]ilence in 
the [c ]ourt."121 Default judgments, rocket dockets, hallway settlements, resolution 
conferences, are not the stuff of courtroom drama and certainly not the stuff of 
intense strategic and skilled parrying between skilled advocates. It is not litigation 
as popularly understood. 
Even when counsel is available, the process accorded low-income disputants 
offers a sober reminder of "litigation" in the real world. A rare and telling judicial 
narrative of litigation "process" in the context of poverty law is Williams v. 
Housing Authority of Baltimore City. 122 
The legal issue in Williams-what would be cited in a Civil Procedure 
textbook l23-was subject matter jurisdiction. A Maryland court known as "Rent 
Court" was created by administrative fiat. It was, in effect, a non-statutory 
appendage to a court of general jurisdiction. This appendage, however, imposed 
a de facto jurisdictional limitation: the only cases that could be heard in "Rent 
Court" were landlord-tenant cases. Not coincidentally, the defendants in virtually 
all of these cases were low-income tenants. 124 
The opinion evokes, to a certain extent, real life-a rarity injudicial opinions. 
As described by the court, Appellant Ethel Williams lived in a public housing 
project "which was infested with rodents and other vermin; the bathtub leaked 
water, causing sinking holes in the floors and mildew and water damage in other 
rooms; and there was a large hole in the kitchen ceiling above the stove, from 
which debris fell into meals as she cooked."125 An unoccupied building next to 
hers-also public housing-"was filled with garbage and debris" which 
contributed to "rodent infestation in her home.,,126 This is not a difficult case both 
intuitively and as a matter oflaw: Ms. Williams has a right to live in an apartment 
that did not endanger her health. 127 
Here is the "process" she was accorded: 
• Williams did not initially have a lawyer. 
supra note 101, at 20B n. 122. 
121 See Bezdek, supra note 108 at 533. 
122 See Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Bait. City, 760 A2d 697 (Md. 2000). 
123 See supra text accompanying notes 66-80 for a discussion of the nonns of litigation as presented 
in legal education. 
124 Bezdek, supra note 108, at 533. 
125 Williams, 760 A2d at 698. 
1261d. at 698-99. 
127 One remedy at issue in Williams is through a procedure called "rent escrow," in which tenants 
deposit rent into a court escrow fund until repairs are made. MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 8-211 
(West 2012). 
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• Williams checked boxes on a fonn pleading to identify 
the relief she was seeking, which included a claim for 
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and warranty 
of habitability. 
• A hearing was held during which her claim for breach 
of the warranty of habitability was not heard because of 
"the lateness of the hour and a large docket." 
• The next hearing was a month later before a different 
judge (there was a "Rent Court" judicial rotation 
system) during which the judge dismissed the claim 
because "Rent Court" had no jurisdiction to hear a 
claim for breach of warranty of habitability. 
• The written order dismissing the claim was never 
found. 
• Williams obtained counsel through a local non-profit 
organization and the attorney duly filed a notice of 
appeal from the dismissal. 
• Williams' attorney requested a transcript ofthe hearing 
in order to prepare the appeal. No transcript was found, 
evidently because no recording of the hearing existed. 
• The appeal of the "Rent Court" dismissal was wrongly 
characterized as "de novo" when it should have been an 
appeal on the record. This mistaken characterization 
was evidently made by a clerk, although who made this 
mistake and when it was made was never discovered. 
• Neither Williams nor her attorney received a notice sent 
by the court of a "trial date," which should actually 
have been for an argument on an appeal. The problem 
was that the notice was sent to the attorney's address 
but was addressed to Williams. No one at the attorney's 
office knew who Williams was, and thus the notice was 
never delivered to either the attorney or to Williams. 
• Neither the attorney nor Williams appeared at the 
purported "trial date" because they did not receive 
notice of it. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case. 
• Williams' attorney made a motion for a new trial and 
the reinstatement of the appeal, and, even though the 
landlord did not respond or contest the motion, the 
motion was "summarily denied" by the court. 
203 
After the summary denial, Williams petitioned the Maryland Court of 
Appeals-Maryland's highest court-to hear the appeal. The Court of Appeals 
granted the request. At long last, the Court found that "Rent Court," along with 
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its purported limited jurisdiction, did not exist under the law. The court remanded 
the case to adjudicate Williams' claim for breach of the warranty of habitability. 128 
The Williams case, sadly, is both typical and atypical of what indigent 
litigants experience. It is typical in terms of the slapdash procedure accorded 
Williams' claim, rife with errors, both administrative and judicial, at every tum. 
It is atypical, however, because Ms. Williams had advantages that few defendants 
in landlord-tenant cases have: I) Williams was represented for at least part of the 
case; 2) Williams was persistent and, evidently, had time available to her to make 
numerous trips to the court; 129 3) most significantly, the case led to a decision by 
the highest court in a state that not only granted Williams relief,I3O but ostensibly, 
created law that would benefit future tenants in pursuing claims. 
Despite this victory at the judicial level, it is unclear whether anything has 
changed. After all, Rent Court-now rightly identified as an administrative 
convenience and not a court oflimitedjurisdiction--can hear claims of breach of 
the warranty of habitability. Whether it will do so competently or meaningfully 
for the masses of tenants who appear before it is highly questionable. 
B. Criminal Cases 
The Constitution affords criminal defendants the right to a "speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury"; 131 the right to due process of law; 132 and the right "to 
have the Assistance of Counsel.,,133 These protections are illusory in almost all 
criminal cases. 134 
Like civil cases, the process accorded criminal defendants, given the massive 
numbers of cases that need to be adjudicated, are negligible. Criminal cases are 
128 Williams, 760 A.2d at 703-06. 
129 Many low-income litigants are hourly workers with unpredictable work schedules, limited child 
care, and no cars. For a compelling look at the challenges facing the working poor, see BARBARA 
EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIM ED: ON (NOT) GETTING By IN AMERICA (200 I). 
130 It is unclear how long it took for Ms. Williams to finally get relief upon remand. It does seem likely 
that a remand directly from the Maryland Court of Appeals would lift the case out of the run of the 
mill docket and minimize the possibility that the long list of clerical errors would repeat themselves. 
See generally Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Bait. City, 760 A.2d 697 (Md. 2000). 
131 U.S. CON ST. amend. VI; U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2. 
132 U.S. CON ST. amend. V; U.S. CaNsT. amend. XIV, § I. 
133 U.S. CaNsT. amend. VI. 
134 The American Bar Association has "urged" states to remedy this problem, although the ABA-a 
non-governmental entity-has little influence apart from matters that directly affect the regulation of 
lawyers. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, EIGHT 
GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS (Aug. 2009) 
http://www.americanbar.org/contentidamlabaJadministrative/legal_ aid _indigent_defendants/Is _ sclai 
d _deC eight_guidelines_of yublic _ defense.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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disposed of through plea bargains in 95% of cases.135 In reality criminal 
"procedure" is a pleading machine. The Supreme Court has said as much: "To a 
large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] 
determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It 
is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system."136 The system would "crash" should more defendants demand a trial. 137 
This is even truer given that the criminal justice system operates in a world of 
mass incarceration. 138 Dark humor has emerged to evoke the realities of criminal 
justice: "meet 'em, greet 'em, plead 'em," 139 or "McJustice."140 
The huge caseloads of public defenders characterize and facilitate this 
system. Inadequate funding generates overwhelming numbers of cases that far 
exceed recommended case handling limits,141 with "[f]ifteen of twenty-two 
statewide defender systems hav[ing] attorney caseloads that exceed national 
standards."142 Increasing caseloads far outstrip the minimal resources available to 
staff offices, and it is thus impossible for publicly funded attorneys to offer 
defendants more than cursory attention, if that. 143 Indeed, public defenders can 
135 Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409 (2008) 
(stating that "[pllea bargaining now dominates the day-to-day operation of the American criminal 
justice system; about ninety-five percent of convictions are obtained by way of a guilty plea."). 
136 A consequence of a system that offers no individualized attention to criminal matters is the risk of 
wrongful convictions. Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 739 (2006). Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.C!. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. 
Scott, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909,1912 (1992». 
137 Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 12/03/11 lopinionlsunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.htmI ("If 
everyone charged with crimes suddenly exercised his constitutional rights, there would not be enough 
judges, lawyers or prison cells to deal with the ensuing tsunami oflitigation."). 
138 Michele Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 495, 497 (2013); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012) (referring to "the American penal 
behemoth"). 
139 RHODE, supra note 92, at 12. 
140 Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance Ajier Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2167 (2013); see Megan Garvey & Jack Leonard, Why L.A. Jail 
Cells Have Revolving Doors, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2006), 
http://articies.latimes.coml2006/dec/26/I0caVme-chum26 (describing "a justice system whose 
resources have not kept pace with demand"). 
141 STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, supra at 12 (noting that in 2007, fifteen of nineteen 
state public defender offices in a study exceeded recommended limits). 
142 Laurence A. Benner, Eliminating Excessive Public Defender Workloads, 26 CRIM. JUST. 24, 25 
(2011). 
143 For example, the Office of the Public Defender in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania "mutinied" and 
refused to accept cases because inadequate funding resulted in overwhelming caseloads. See John 
Rudolf, Pennsylvania Public Defenders Rebel Against Crushing Caseloads, HUFFINGTON POST (June 
6, 2012), available at www.huffingtonpost.coml2012/05/30/pennsylvania-public-
defenders_n_1556192.html. The "mutiny" ultimately led to a class action lawsuit, Flora v. Luzerne 
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only typically allocate "seven minutes per case."144 In one state over 90% of 
homicide cases involve no discovery. 145 
Another unfortunate result of inadequate funding is that private attorneys 
retained by states to represent indigent defendants are paid preposterously low 
fees. A range of jurisdictions offer hourly rates of $30 to $50, with maximums 
ranging from $1,000 to $1,250. 146 Low fees often generate low, if even that, 
quality representation. An oft-told story involves a criminal defense lawyer in a 
death penalty case who could name only one criminal law case: Miranda v. 
Arizona. 147 The only other case he named was Dred Scott, which was actually a 
civil case. 148 The absurdity of the current system is perhaps best illustrated by the 
developing jurisprudence on whether sleeping attorneys violate a criminal 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to "effective assistance of counsel." 149 
County. See Michael P. Buffer, Failed Public Defender Settlement Up for Discussion, 
CmZENSVOICE.COM (Feb. 6, 2013) available at http://citizensvoice.com/news/failed-public-
settlement-up-for-discussion-I. 
144 ACCESS TO JUSTICE INITIATIVE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2012), available at 
www.justice.gov/atj/accomplishments.pdf. 
145 Monroe H. Freedman, Lecture, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 
911,913 (2005). The precise figures are that there is no discovery in 92% of homicide cases and 93% 
of felonies other than homicide. [d.; see also GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: 
How THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 21 (2008) (stating that 
"[i]ndigent defendants are lucky to have a warm body and even a few minutes to discuss their case 
with that warm body"). 
146 See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 77, at 798 (including statistics on fee limits in different 
jurisdictions). 
147 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the 
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.1. 1835,1839 (1994). 
148 [d. 
149 Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying a three step analysis regarding 
whether a sleeping attorney constitutes violation of criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel: (I) did counsel sleep for repeated and/or prolonged lapses; (2) was 
counsel actually unconscious; and (3) were the defendant's interests at stake while counsel was 
asleep?). For other applications of this test, see Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F.Supp.2d 854, 863-66 (S.D. 
Tex. 1999), aff'd., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 200 I), cert. den. Cockrell v. Burdine, 
122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002). The 9th Circuit has held that an attorney has to sleep during a "substantial 
portion of a trial" to constitute ineffective assistance. Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th 
Cir. 1984). The 6th Circuit recently applied this rule in Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011). 
The Muniz Court held that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel because Muniz's 
attorney "was asleep for an undetermined portion ofa single ... cross-examination" and "not asleep 
for the entire cross since he objected near the end of the questioning." Muniz could thus not "establish 
that his trial counsel was asleep for a substantial portion of his trial." Jd. at 623. 
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The inadequacy of resources accorded to representation for indigent criminal 
defendants, is not a new circumstance l50 and continues to intensify. 151 It renders 
the "right to assistance of counsel" famously set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright 
hollow at best. 152 Under these circumstances, lawyers simply cannot provide 
competent representation in accordance with basic mandates of professional 
ethics. 153 
VI. CAN LITIGATION BE PROPERLY DEFINED? 
Ifthe dictionary is wrong, can it be set aright or are there at least trends that 
suggest a shift towards better capturing reality? Is there hope for a more nuanced 
understanding of what litigation really means for almost everyone who 
experiences it? 
In attempting to answer this question, this Section is organized around the 
groups discussed in Section II above: 154 the lay public, lawyers, and law students. 
The proffered answers are straightforward and necessarily speculative. The good 
news is that in some instances there is cause for measured optimism. 
150 PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE 
STUDIES 73 (1988) ("A case load of 30--45 cases, and the constant, unyielding, wearying pressure of 
having six court appearances in four different courtrooms, all set for 9:00 am."). 
151 For statistics regarding current funding, see Hannah Levintoya et aI., Charts: Why You're in Deep 
Trouble If You Can't Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 6,2013,5:00 AM), available at 
http://www.mothetjones.com/politicsI20 13/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts. 
(statistics on current funding); see also Erik Eckholm, Public Defenders, Bolstered by a Work Analysis 
and Rulings, Push Back Against a Tide of Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 14/02/19/us/public-defenders-turn-to-Iawmakers-to-try-to-ease-
caseloads.html?J=). There is, however, virtually no large scale study of the percentage of criminal 
defendants represented by public defenders or their equivalent. See also Erica J. Hashimoto, Assessing 
the Indigent Defense System in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: A PROGRESSIVE BLUEPRINT FOR 
THE SECOND TERM, AM. CONST. SOC'y (Sept. 2013) available at 
http://www.acslaw.orglpublicationslissue-briefs/assessing-the-indigent-defense-system-O. 
152See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Anthony Lewis' Gideon's Trumpet (1964), 
published shortly after Gideon was decided, traces the story of the case. In recent years many have 
noted the how the promise of Gideon remains unfulfilled. See also Heather Baxter, Gideon's Ghost: 
Providing the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, MICH. ST. L. REV. 
341 (2010). The fiftieth anniversary of Gideon in 2013 generated a spate of critiques. See Stephen V. 
Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance qfter Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 
YALE LJ. 2150, 2174 ("[M]ost state governments have treated the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gideon not as a bright star pointing the way to justice, but as an unfunded mandate to be resisted."); 
see also Dripps, supra note 96, at 900 (stating "Gideon's 'triumph' is [a] ... 'storybook'-an 
unrealized dream, a myth"). 
153 Heather Baxter, Too Many Clients, Too Little Time: How States Are Forcing Public Defenders To 
Violate Their Ethical Obligations, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 91 (2012). 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 7-85. 
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A. The Public: No 
If public perceptions of "litigation" are to change, what "strikes the senses" 
must change. Public media thrives on the sensational and the outlandish. As to the 
poor, Dwight MacDonald wrote the following in 1963: "There is a monotony 
about the injustices suffered by the poor that perhaps accounts for the lack of 
interest the rest of society shows in them. Everything seems to go wrong with 
them. They never win. It's just boring."155 
It is boring to cover or portray tens of thousands of daily eVictIOns, or 
foreclosures, or plea bargains, or deportations. Hence, except for the occasional 
newspaper article about housing court or "McJustice" in criminal courts, 156 there 
is no sustained attention on the true nature of "litigation." It does not "strike the 
senses," nor is it likely to. 
B. Law Students and Lawyers: Perhaps 
There is nothing to suggest that more lawyers will represent litigants 
embroiled in the mass ofiitigation. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that 
fewer lawyers will represent these litigants. 157 Legal education, however, is 
changing and, as the precursor to practice, these changes suggest some cause for 
optimism. The 120 year hold of Langdellian pedagogy in law school158 seems, 
ever so slowly, to be losing its grip. A number of different trends reflect this 
change. 
First, clinical education, which first rose to prominence in the early 1970's, 159 
continues to grow and gain legitimacy in the academy. The call for a "clinical law 
school" is nothing new-it is traceable to at least 1896160 and has been repeated 
with regularity ever since. 161 Now, however, there is greater recognition that 
clinical legal education is a particularly effective pedagogy for law students.162 
ISS Dwight MacDonald, Our Invisible Poor, THE NEW YORKER, (Jan. 19, 1963), available at 
http://www.newyorker.comJarchive/1963/01/19/1963_01_19 _082_ TNY _ CARDS_000075671 ?curre 
ntPage=all). The article is a review of Michael Harrington's famous book THE OTHER AMERICA: 
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1962). 
156 For some examples, see Desmond, supra note 97; Cha & Dennis, supra note 110; Corkery, supra 
note 110; Benner, supra note 142; Rudolf, supra note 143. 
IS7 As noted above, lawyers are increasingly representing organizations, not individuals. See supra text 
accompanying note 82. 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
159DVD: An Oral History o/Clinical Legal Education Part I, Seeds o/Change, (Dis Makers 2006). 
160 Blewett Lee, Teaching Practice in Law Schools, 19 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 507 (1896). 
161 William V. Rowe, Legal Clinics and Beller Trained Lawyers-A Necessity, 9 U. ILL. L. REV. 591, 
595-96 (1917); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). 
162 Clinical pedagogy has become highly sophisticated and well-developed over the years. For a 
collection of some of the more prominent articles, see ALEX J. HURDER ET AL., CLINICAL 
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An added advantage is that clinical education necessarily exposes law students to 
poor people's courts because clinic students in law school usually learn about 
practice by representing indigents. 163 Observing and experiencing these courts 
"strike the senses" and, presumably, will become an embedded memory wherever 
law students practice after law school. Law students become lawyers, and, having 
their senses struck, they will now know real litigation. 164 
Another trend gaining traction among states, albeit slowly, is to require 
candidates for a state bar to complete a defined number of pro bono hours. As of 
this writing, one state-New York-has implemented such a requirement, 165 
although three others are considering comparable proposals.1 66 The impetus 
behind the proposal was, as stated by New York's Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, 
to "bridge the continuing access to justice gap ... which has resulted in thousands 
of litigants who cannot afford legal representation to pursue their basic rights 
involving housing, family, and other essential matters." 167 Pro bono in the New 
York proposal, however, can include working or "non-profit organizations," work 
"in the judiciary," or work in the government, all of which might or might not 
involve representing indigents. 168 New York's initiative nevertheless would 
expose at least some lawyers to the realities oflitigation. 169 
ANTHOLOGY: READINGS FOR LIVE-CLIENT CLINICS 59-118 (1997). A journal devoted to clinical legal 
education-the Clinical Law Review-began publication in 1994. I CLINICAL L. REV. I (1994). 
163 Sarah Buhler, Painful Injustices: Encountering Social Suffering in Clinical Legal Education, 19 
CLINICAL L. REV. 405 (2013). For a discussion on how the initial growth of clinical education was 
intertwined with providing assistance to the unrepresented, see PHILIP G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL 
MELTSNER, REFLECTIONS ON CLINICAL LEGAL EOUCA nON 3010 (1998). 
164 A related development is the passage by the American Bar Association of a new requirement that 
law students take six credits of "experiential courses," which can include clinics, although they may 
also include other types of practice that do not involve poverty law. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF 
PROCEDURE FOR ApPROVAL OF LAW SCHS., STANDARD 303 (2014-2015) available at 
http://www.americanbar.orglcontentldamlabalpublicationslmisc/legal_ educationlStandards/20 14_20 
15 _aba_standards _ chapter3 .authcheckdam.pdf. 
165 N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (2014). 
166 The other three states are California, Montana, and New Jersey. The American Bar Association 
monitors the status of these inItiatives. Bar Pre-Admission Pro Bono, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.orglgroups/probonoyublic_service/policylbar~re_admission~ro_bono.ht 
ml (last visited Jan. 13,2015). A Subcommittee of the ABA itself has studied the "pros and cons" of 
a pre-admission pro bono requirement. ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service, 
New York's 50-hour Preadmission Pro Bono Rule: Weighing the Potential Pros and Cons, A.B.A. 
(Oct. 2013) http://www.law .upenn.edullive/filesI2420-aba-wh ite-paper-on-ny-pro-bono. 
167 Press Release, New York State Unified Court System (Sept. 19,2012) (on file with author). 
16' Debate about what constitutes "pro bono" in rules of professional conduct often center on whether 
it should involve individual representation or other law refomIlorganizational representation. 
169 Not everyone supports pro bono as an effective means to provide representation to litigants or as a 
means to educate future lawyers. For example, some have argued that pro bono proposals "deflect 
public attention from ... more productive ways of addressing" the "unmet legal needs" for legal 
services. Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 
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Third, at least one state has mandated an "access to justice" topic on the bar 
exam.170 The bar examination tends to strongly influence the law school 
curriculum, and even such coverage in a bar review course-heretofore hardly a 
source of information about the distortions of litigation-is all to the good. 
Fourth, and most broadly, recent studies have proposed reform oflaw school 
pedagogy.171 For example, Roy Stuckey recommends that "[l]aw schools should 
give more attention to educating students about the importance of providing 
access to justice and to instilling a commitment to provide access to justice in their 
students.,,172 Other studies have offered comparable recommendations. 173 
None of these trends, on their own, portend a sea change in legal education. 
But there is some movement nevertheless, and this movement generates some 
cause for optimism, however modest, that the realities of litigation-and thus of 
law-will become part of what is purported to be legal education. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The dictionary definition of "litigate" - "a legal contest by judicial process" 
-is almost always wrong. 174 It is not driven by law because the adjudicative 
system is far too overwhelmed to be governed by it. It is not a "contest" because 
the so-called "contest" is rigged to produce a preordained result. 
Words matter, and when we say "litigation" it is not what litigation really is. 
To recall Dwight MacDonald, the realities oflitigation might be boring. 175 In light 
of its tragic consequences, however, they are well worth knowing. 
FORDHAM L. REv. 2415, 2424 (1999). The irony is that while this might be true, there is virtually no 
"public attention" anyway, so there is no "public attention" to deflect. 
170 MASSACHUSETIS ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION, ADDITION OF "ACCESS TO JUSTICE" TOPIC TO 
THE MASSACHUSETIS BAR EXAMINATION (June 6, 2013) available at http://www.massaccessto 
justice.orglresources/amendment-bbe-rules-proposal.pdf. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
has since unanimously adopted the proposal. 
171 A seminal example is ABA, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: 
NARROWING THE GAP (I 992) available at http://www.americanbar.orglcontentldamlaba! 
publications/misc/legal_ educationl20 13 Jegal_ education_and -"rofessional_ development_ maccrate_ 
report).authcheckdam.pdf. This effort is universally called the "MacCrate Report." Another prominent 
and more recent example is usually referred to as the Carnegie Report. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., 
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). See also Roy STUCKEY 
ET AL., BEST PRACTICE IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 29 (2007). For an overview 
of these reports and other recent trends in legal education, see Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or 
Retrenchment: Legal Education at a Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735 (2011). 
172 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 171. 
173 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
174 "Litigate, " MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/litigate (last visited 
Jan. 13,2015). 
175 See supra text accompanying notes ISS. 
